I. Introduction
For much of the post-war period financial institutions in North America, Europe and Japan typically operated in highly regulated markets, with controls that affected both the scope and the location of their activities. Many national and local markets remained segmented, with barriers to entry generating excess capacity and productive inefficiencies. But since the 1980s there has been a widespread dismantling of capital and exchange controls and a sustained period of deregulation and liberalisation of financial markets in many industrialised economies, with prudential regulation replacing structural regulation. In conjunction with advances in information technologies and the increasing globalisation of markets for goods and services, deregulation has generated rapid growth in international capital markets.
Financial market integration has been stimulated by significant consolidation within national markets as well as the rapid expansion in cross-border linkages between firms through both mergers and acquisitions and co-operative joint ventures and alliances. In the period from 1991-2000 financial companies accounted for approximately one-quarter of global crossborder mergers and acquisitions (UNCTAD, 2001 , Table B10 ). The capitalisation of equity and bond markets has risen significantly over the last twenty years, helped by a growing trend towards securitisation within many national economies, and lending by financial institutions has expanded significantly, both in domestic and, more especially, international markets.
These changes are, on balance, likely to be welfare enhancing. National financial markets have become more contestable, with competitive pressures encouraging product innovations and a reduction in excess capacity and operational inefficiencies. The prospects for economic growth are also likely to have been improved, with domestic investors now able to raise finance from a larger volume of savings using a wider variety of financial instruments. But capital market integration may also bring costs as well as benefits. Consolidation has been associated with an increasing complexity in the structure of financial institutions across sectors and across countries and the removal of structural regulation has raised risk taking incentives. The costs of internal and external monitoring of the activities of such firms have risen accordingly, raising the need for managers and regulators to take action to ensure the provision of timely information to assess solvency and prevent potential systemic risk.
Inevitably, internal and external linkages, whether hierarchical or co-operative in nature, raise the potential scale and speed at which events in one location or institution could spread to other parts of the global financial system. The objectives of this paper are to examine some of the important forces causing financial institutions to change their corporate strategies and to discuss the wider impact of deeper financial market integration on the major industrialised economies. We begin by providing a stylised representation of the two main forms of financial systems found in most industrialised economies, the Anglo-US market based model and the bank based system commonly found in continental Europe and Asia. The historical evolution of these two models reflected differences in institutional structures as well as in regulatory frameworks. We then describe the main changes seen in the regulation of financial markets in the United States and the European Union over the last two decades, developments which have been reinforced by technological changes and the advent of monetary union in Europe. In Section III we describe some of the consequences of these and other changes for the internationalisation and integration of financial markets, looking in particular at recent developments in the foreign exchange market, the rapid rise in the number and value of mergers, acquisitions and joint ventures in financial markets, and the growth of cross-border lending by banks located in the major industrialised economies.
Little is known about the impact of joint ventures, particularly across national borders, but, as we discuss in Section IV, much can be learned from reviewing the factors driving crossborder location in the banking sector and the impact of mergers on the efficiency of the investing banks. Two of the wider consequences of the growth in financial markets -the implications for regulators and the relationships between financial development and growth are considered in Section V, where we show that cross-border investments, as measured by foreign direct investment, appear to be more closely correlated with the cross-sectional variation in the growth rates of the major industrialised economies in the 1990s than do other indicators of financial development. Some concluding comments are given in Section VI.
In common with other related papers on the growth of financial markets we concentrate primarily on developments within the banking sector in this paper, partly to keep matters to a manageable length, but also because the majority of the extant literature on financial markets focuses on this sector. However, where possible, we try to also discuss developments in nonbank financial services, such as insurance, securities dealing and asset management, which have become relatively more important over time. For example, whilst the outstanding stock of cross-border bank lending continues to exceed the value of the outstanding stock of international debt securities, the latter has been the most important source of cross-border credit to non-banks since 1999 (Wooldridge, 2002) .
II. Deregulation and Financial Systems in the United States and Europe
For many years the post-war period was characterised by the development of two distinct sorts of relationship between commercial banking and other types of financial activity such as insurance and securities dealing and underwriting. In some countries, most notably the US, legislation ensured that the two activities remained separated. Other forms of structural regulation, such as quantitative restrictions on credit growth or interest rates, also restricted financial activity from time to time. In other countries, especially in continental Europe, universal banking was permitted, with financial institutions allowed to engage in all kinds of financial activities. A common feature of such systems was the development of close links between banks and non-financial firms, either through equity stakes or board participation.
The opportunities for cross-border transactions were also often limited, with many countries having some form of controls in place which artificially restricted the movements of goods, services and capital. Financial markets were particularly affected by the constraints on international capital flows, designed to help maintain currency stability, that existed in many industrialised economies until well into the 1980s.
However since that time the American and European markets have both seen a gradual deregulation of restrictions that previously acted to segment national and international financial markets. By themselves these regulatory reforms would have generated significant structural changes and the removal of excess capacity; in conjunction with the new trading opportunities made possible by technological improvements they have acted to spur the rapid consolidation of financial institutions by changing the optimal scale of production, and expanding the supply of international financial services (Berger et al, 1999; Cavallo and Rossi, 2001 ).
Historical differences in national financial systems were also a reflection of differences in the institutional environment within which they developed (La Porta et al, 1998; Tsuru, 2000) . In general, countries such as the US and the UK with a common-law tradition that supports the rights of shareholders have tended to have a more highly developed and varied market-based, or 'arm's length' financial system. Countries whose commercial laws are based on a civil law tradition, such as those in continental Europe, have tended to have bank-based (sometimes termed 'relationship based') financial systems.
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The distinctive features of market and bank based systems are perhaps more apparent in their forms of corporate governance than in their patterns of corporate finance. In all industrialised countries internal finance is the dominant source of funds for corporate investment, although the share of external finance in total finance does tend to be larger in countries with bankbased systems (Corbett and Jenkinson, 1997) .
Under a market based system, a large number of specialised financial markets and institutions provide different forms of financial instruments and perform monitoring functions. Such a framework relies heavily on legal enforcement, as explicit contracts are the sole form of protection for external creditors of a firm. Public information and disclosure requirements are particularly important to help ensure legal enforcement and achieve allocative efficiency.
1 Within the civil tradition there are three major legal families that can be distinguished -French, German and Scandinavian (La Porta et al, 1998) . Common law countries tend to offer the best protection for the rights of shareholders, while Germanic-origin countries have a higher quality of creditor rights and Scandinavian-origin countries benefit from strong law enforcement and accounting standards. Investor protection tends to be weakest in countries with a French civil law tradition.
Agency costs are more likely to arise in this form of financial system, but it is more likely that finance will be provided to help to support new, risky activities at a time of rapid technological changes, such as the development and use of information and communications technologies (Jorgenson, 2001 ).
Bank-based systems have an advantage over securities markets for financing long-term investment projects in mature industries where innovation and uncertainty are low (Allen and Gale, 2000) . Such systems provide a good way of overcoming agency costs. But inevitably there are fewer opportunities available for outsiders, reducing the potential for competition. Disclosure requirements tend to be weaker as well, since often only a single external financier needs to acquire information.
The ongoing consolidation in financial markets has begun to blur the distinction between the different kinds of financial system. In the US, deregulation has led to the creation of new integrated financial groups, whilst in Europe, deregulation has been associated with moves to open up previously segmented markets to external competition and strengthen the provision of finance from securities markets and the role of institutional investors.
Deregulation in the United States
In the United States restrictions on both intrastate and interstate activities were gradually relaxed over the 1980s and early 1990s. Prior to then banking markets had been fragmented by historical prohibitions on interstate banking and the separation of investment and commercial banking codified in the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933. The Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994 eliminated remaining restrictions on interstate banking and branching as of June 1997, making nationwide banking possible.
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As we show below, these changes have been associated with significant consolidation in the banking industry. Insurance and securities companies have been less affected, reflecting the absence of previous restrictions on their geographic scope.
A particular feature of the US financial system is the presence of large investment banks such as Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley and Merrill Lynch, all of which grew in influence as a result of the historical separation of lending and securities work. Moves to reduce the barriers between commercial banking and securities and insurance activities began in 1987 when the Federal Reserve allowed commercial banks to establish particular forms of subsidiary companies (often termed 'Section 20 subsidiaries') in order to underwrite corporate debt and equity, although the permitted scale of underwriting could not exceed 5% of the subsidiary's total revenue. The permitted scale of underwriting was raised to 10% in 1989 and 25% in 1996 (Berger et al, 1999 and . The Financial Services Modernisation Act of 1999 (sometimes termed the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act) removed most of the remaining barriers among banking, insurance and securities activities, although barriers between financial services and non-financial business were retained. In effect this has allowed the market rather than regulators to decide which forms of financial company are viable.
In the two years following the Act just under 600 new financial holding companies (FHCs) were created, although the majority of these were relatively small. Most of the section 20 subsidiaries were converted into subsidiaries of FHCs (Olson, 2002) . Regulatory and accounting differences continue to affect the ability of commercial banks to participate in investment banking markets. For instance, commercial banks book loans at their historical cost whereas investment banks use market prices. Functional regulation still persists, with the direct supervision of financial services firms remaining in the hands of their historic regulators. FHC licences are handed out by the Federal Reserve, which is the traditional regulator of commercial banks. None of the large US-owned investment banks with a global presence have currently chosen to become financial holding companies. This suggests that some of the potential efficiency gains that might be expected from the deregulation of segmented markets within the US may have yet to emerge.
Deregulation in Europe
The Single Market Programme (SMP) and the subsequent formation of monetary union have generated substantial structural changes in European financial markets since the mid-1980s (Gual, 1999) . Prior to the advent of the SMP most European countries had fragmented banking systems, with differing national regulations and standards preventing market entry, especially in wholesale banking. The key element of reform was the Second Banking Directive adopted in 1989 for implementation by 1993. The measures in this Directive and other SMP initiatives were based on the principle of mutual recognition, with host nations allowing foreign institutions from other EU economies to undertake the full range of activities permitted in their home market. At the same time minimum standards were imposed for all financial institutions in the EU in order to prevent excessive competition for market share through excessively lax rules and regulations which might ultimately raise systemic risk. A detailed summary of the SMP reforms is provided by Murphy (2000) . Together they raised market contestability, created incentives for cross-border investments and rationalisation of excess capacity, and allowed larger institutions freedom to try and exploit economies of scale and economies of scope by expanding their range of products and services. Banks have been allowed to operate freely across national borders in Europe since 1993, with universal banking becoming the norm. The process of concentration and restructuring has been particularly marked in the smaller EU countries (ECB, 2000) ; in Sweden and Finland the impetus provided by the SMP was reinforced by restructuring in the aftermath of the Scandinavian banking crisis in the early 1990s.
The historical segmentation of financial markets in Europe also stemmed from the presence of foreign exchange risk and the existence of many legal obstacles to international diversification, such as prudential requirements governing the currency composition of assets and liabilities and, prior to the early 1990s, exchange controls in many countries (Arrowsmith et al, 1997; Gual, 1999) . This segmentation acted as a de facto barrier to entry and raised rents for local institutions such as investment banks (often universal banks) which specialised in placing issues in their home country markets. Becoming a pan-European institution involved the creation of a network of local marketing and research teams.
Monetary union has eliminated exchange rate risk for intra-EMU trades and also relaxed the severity of the constraints imposed by asset-liability currency matching requirements. Both these changes would be expected to reduce market segmentation. For example, the costs of building up marketing and research capacity at a pan-European level for investment banks both inside and outside the Euro Area have fallen, which should serve to raise the overall contestability of many financial markets. Underwriting fees for bonds denominated in European currencies, which had been almost double those for US dollar denominated bonds prior to 1999, have declined significantly since the start of monetary union (Galati and Tsatsaronis, 2001) , and the differential with fees for dollar bonds has disappeared.
Since 1999 the European Commission has begun to pursue a series of further deregulatory measures outlined in the Financial Services Action Plan (FSAP) agreed at the Cologne European Council in June that year. The majority of these are aimed at ensuring greater harmonisation between remaining national standards and regulations, although the continuing existence of barriers to foreign investors in some countries is also a matter of concern. Progress in the first two years is summarised in EC (2001a,b) . The introduction of measures aimed at deeper integration of European financial services markets stems primarily from a perception that enhanced financial development will improve the prospects for future economic growth. There are no official estimates of what might be expected from the FSAP, but unofficial estimates by the European Financial Round Table suggest that a properly functioning single financial market could raise EU GDP by 0.7% per annum (Davies, 2002) .
Deregulation, technological change, globalisation and macroeconomic policies are all exerting pressure in the same direction on structure of financial markets and the efficiency of financial institutions. Altunbaş et al (2001) estimate that technical progress reduced costs in European banking markets by an average 3% per annum between 1989-97, with higher gains being enjoyed by the largest banks. In some EU countries these forces have also been supplemented by the impact of the privatisation of publicly-owned credit institutions and moves towards 'demutualisation' of particular institutions, such as building societies in the UK.
III. Trends In Financial Market Integration
The worldwide trend towards liberalised financial markets, along with the move to institutionalisation, the decline in transactions costs due to new technologies and the development of new financial instruments have all combined to bring a rapid growth in the level of international financial transactions. In this section we look at four measures of the extent of financial integration -foreign exchange and derivatives trading, mergers and acquisitions, joint ventures and alliances, and cross-border bank lending.
III.1 Foreign exchange and derivatives markets
The average daily turnover in the global markets for foreign exchange and derivatives is summarised in Table 1 . The size of these markets has implications for the effectiveness and scope of monetary policy transmission mechanisms. For instance, the scale of trading in the foreign exchange market can affect the extent to which the monetary authorities are able to influence exchange rates through unilateral, and even co-ordinated, official interventions. Even so, turnover was still equivalent to nearly 4% of global GDP and one-sixth of total world trade in goods and services. Some 57% of turnover consisted of cross-border transactions between parties located in different countries, up from 54% in 1995 and 1998 and 50% in 1992. The decline in turnover between 1998 and 2001 can be partly accounted for by the effects of the formation of the Euro Area, which ended trading in the currencies of the former member states, wiping out 6% of total turnover (Galati, 2001 ). In the 2001 Survey the euro entered one side of 38% of all currency transactions, whereas in 1998 the currencies of the Euro Area members entered 52% of all transactions. Other factors which may have served to limit turnover include technological changes, such as electronic broking, which are likely to have improved price transparency and the speed with which arbitrage opportunities are exploited, and the lower levels of market participation by many hedge funds whose profitability was adversely affected by their exposures during the emerging markets crises of 1997-99.
Trading in currency derivatives also declined between 1998 and 2001. However this was more than counteracted by rapid growth of trade in interest rate derivatives, and the total average daily turnover in global over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives markets rose by 53% to $575 billion. Cross-border contracts accounted for 58% of total derivatives activity in 2001, compared to 54% in 1995. Around one-third of all turnover in both the derivatives and foreign exchange markets was accounted for by transactions by UK-based institutions, approximately twice the share of the next largest host, the United States.
III.2 Financial Mergers and Acquisitions
The number and value of mergers and acquisitions by financial firms in 13 of the 16 largest OECD economies over the period 1991-99 are reported in Table 2 and shown as a proportion of nominal GDP in these countries in Chart 1.
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The data are classified according to the country and sector of the acquiring firm. Around 96% of all recorded acquisitions took place in the same countries.
The upward trend in the number and scale of transactions is readily apparent, particularly after 1994. Acquisitions by banks rose rapidly from 1995 onwards, partly reflecting the timing of legislative deregulation in the United States. Acquisitions by insurance companies and securities firms (a category that includes investment banks) began to accelerate from 1997 onwards. The value of the average deal rose significantly over the 1990s, as can be seen from the global totals in Table 2 . In 1997-99 the number of transactions was 50% higher than in 1991-93, but the total value was more than eight times the size.
Cross-border acquisitions have gradually become more important over time, accounting for 19.3% of the total number of transactions and 13% of the value of transactions in 1997-99, compared to 12% and 8.8% respectively in 1991-93. However it continues to be the case that the average size of cross-border acquisitions remains well below that of within-border acquisitions. Most acquisitions are within-industry, although the share of cross-industry deals has risen over time, especially in value terms. In 1997-99, 20.9% of all deals were crossindustry, accounting for 17.3% of the value of deals. Clearly the average size of crossindustry deals is lower than that of within-industry deals. Source: see Table 2 .
In the lower panels of Table 2 we report the distribution of the total number of transactions according to the location and industry of the acquiring firm. Over half of all acquisitions are by firms from North America, with the vast majority of these occurring within national borders. The value of within-border cross-industry deals rose sharply in the 1997-99
subperiod, primarily reflecting the formation of Citigroup in 1998 by the merger of Citicorp, a bank holding company, and Travelers, which was a securities and insurance firm. Carow
(2001) provides a detailed overview of this merger and its subsequent effects.
Western European firms accounted for around one-third of all transactions, although their combined GDP is under one-quarter of the total sample of countries. In contrast, the share of the Pacific Rim countries, Japan and Australia, during the 1990s was well below their share of GDP. One notable feature is that cross-border acquisitions are much more likely to be undertaken by Western European firms, partly reflecting the size of individual national markets, but also the incentives and opportunities provided by the Single Market Programme and the advent of monetary union.
Around two-thirds of all acquisitions have been by banking sector firms, with the vast majority of the target firms being other banks within national borders. To a large extent this reflects the marked consolidation that has taken place in the US banking industry. The number of banking organisations in the US declined from around 12,300 in 1980 to just over 6,600 by the middle of 2001 and the share of banking assets held by the largest 25 banks rose from 33% to 61% (Olson, 2002) . Acquisitions by insurance and securities firms are more likely to take place across industries and across national borders. However the aggregate rise in the share of all transactions accounted for by cross-border deals stems primarily from the rise in the proportion of banking sector transactions that are cross-border.
The main features of the consolidation process in the EU banking sector from 1995 to the middle of 2000 are analysed in ECB (2000) . As the data in Banking sector concentration rose in almost all member states between 1995-99, and was typically higher in the smallest countries. In 1999 the market share of the five largest institutions exceeded 70% in Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Greece, Netherlands, Portugal, and Sweden. Ireland, Luxembourg and Austria were exceptions, the former two because of the presence of many foreign banks and the latter because it has a large number of small credit institutions. Despite this, Austria, along with Denmark, Germany and Italy, is estimated to have the most efficient banks in Europe by Altunbaş et al (2001) .
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Looking at international bank M&As, it was found that, numerically at least, the majority of cross-border banking transactions by EU institutions were outside the European Economic Area, partly reflecting a desire to raise profitability by expanding in emerging markets. The banking sector also appeared to be the driving force behind the formation of financial conglomerates -groups of financial companies operating in different sectors of the financial industry. However, in some EU countries at least, there continue to be significant impediments to foreign ownership of financial institutions (Davies, 2002) .
Conglomerates can be set up through mergers or by financial institutions setting up a subsidiary company in another financial sector. Over the period 1997-99 both forms of investment accounted for a roughly equal proportion of national and cross-border conglomerate transactions. Chart 2 shows the total number of conglomerate transactions per year since 1995. Just under four-fifths of transactions concerned institutions from five EU countries, Italy, the UK, Luxembourg, Portugal and Greece. With the exception of Italy, most transactions by institutions from these countries involved the establishment of enterprises in new sectors of the financial industry rather than direct acquisitions.
In other countries, notably Austria and Denmark, linkages between different segments of the financial services industry were increased through the establishment of jointly owned enterprises. These offer specialised financial services, such as asset management and stockbroking activities, marketed through all their respective owners which are often within the banking sector. 
III.3 Financial Joint Ventures and Strategic Alliances
The number of joint ventures and strategic alliances entered into by financial firms is shown in Table 3 . These data are shown only by number of transactions, so direct comparison with the mergers and acquisitions data in terms of size and industry mix is not possible.
Nonetheless the data show the same aggregate trend, with the number of joint ventures rising sharply during the 1990s. The general pattern of the data suggests that joint ventures are much more likely to be undertaken when market entry is difficult, particularly across national borders. Asiedu and Esfahani (2001) provide a detailed analysis of the different factors affecting the host and home country firm share of cross-border joint ventures.
The total number of joint ventures and strategic alliances in 1997-99 was less than two-thirds of the total number of mergers, but the number of cross-border joint ventures was greater than the number of cross-border mergers. Cross border ventures accounted for around 40% of all joint ventures over the sample period, more than twice their share of mergers and acquisitions. The geographical distribution of cross border ventures was remarkably equal by 1997-99, with around one-third of alliances taking place in each of the three main supranational markets. Joint ventures in Western Europe and the Pacific Rim are much more likely to be across national borders than within national borders, possibly reflecting both average country size and the prevalence of barriers to product market entry in the form of national differences in factors such as regulatory and accounting systems. Although the number of cross-border mergers by financial firms grew rapidly during the 1990s, firms from this sector were less likely to invest overseas than firms from other sectors. This is illustrated in Chart 3, using data from Focarelli and Pozzolo (2001) for 29 OECD economies classified by the sector of the bidder. Financial mergers accounted for over 40% of the total number of mergers over this period, but represented only 27% of all cross-border mergers. Cross-border mergers represented just 15% of all finance mergers, compared to 34% of all manufacturing mergers. Note: cross-border ratio is the ratio of cross-border to total transactions in each sector.
Source: authors calculations from Focarelli and Pozzolo (2001, To some extent the difference in the proportion of mergers that involve cross-border transactions in the financial and non-financial sectors stems from the particularly large number of financial mergers within the United States, which serves to reduce the overall proportion of cross-border transactions in the banking sector. Focarelli and Pozzolo (2001, 
III.4 Cross-Border Banking Transactions
Deregulation and other structural changes have also helped cross-border banking activity to rise rapidly in recent years, especially in the interbank market. For example, cross-border interbank claims between banks located in the Euro Area rose from $650 billion in 1995-97
to over $900 billion after the start of monetary union in 1999 (Galati and Tsatsaronis, 2001 ). Most of this was accounted for by larger banks trading across borders, reflecting their greater expertise at dealing with foreign counterparts, with smaller institutions continuing to operate largely at the national level.
An indication of the aggregate foreign exposure of national banking systems in the major industrialised economies is provided in Table 4 , which shows consolidated foreign onbalance sheet claims by banks in the BIS reporting area as of the third quarter of 2001. These comprise all cross-border claims by reporting banks incorporated in the respective country plus local and foreign currency lending by their foreign affiliates. Banks from the eleven countries shown in the Table account for 79.4% of all cross-border lending by banks within the BIS reporting area.
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The total claims outstanding were $11.6 trillion (approximately 37% of world GDP at market exchange rates in 2001), of which 80% represented lending to firms, banks and governments in other developed economies. Claims on developing economies represented approximately 11½% of total claims, with the remainder accounted for largely by claims on offshore banking centres in Asia and the Caribbean. Banks from the United States, Germany and Spain are relatively exposed in developing economies, accounting for 13-19% respectively of total lending. Claims on other banks accounted for 46.5% of the total global amount of outstanding claims and 50.3% of claims on the developed economies.
Overall, whilst banks from the largest economies account for the bulk of total claims, the exposure of all but Germany is relatively small in relation to the size of their home 9 In the non-financial sector, 18% of purchases by US firms were cross-border, compared to 39.4% of purchases by non-US firms. 10 The remaining lending is by banks from a further 12 countries: Austria, Denmark, Finland, Hong Kong, Ireland, Luxembourg, Norway, Portugal, Singapore, Taiwan, Turkey and Sweden. As the data are measured using market exchange rates the shares of individual lenders and borrowers will be sensitive to currency fluctuations.
economies. Foreign claims of US banks in 2001Q3 were equivalent to only 8½% of the level of US GDP in 2000 for instance. Several small economies, notably Switzerland, Belgium and Netherlands, have large foreign banking claims relative to the size of their economies and also relative to the size of domestic bank claims on domestic residents, which are shown in Table 6 below.
The pattern of lending to developing economies is clearly strongly influenced by both historical ties and geographical links. French banks account for over one-fifth of all lending to Africa and the Middle East, German banks for over a third of all lending to developing European nations and US and Spanish banks together account for almost 60% of lending to Latin America. Japanese banks are relatively prominent elsewhere in Asia, including in offshore centres. British banks also have a strong presence in these centres, accounting for almost one quarter of total claims in them. The geographical divergence in the spread and scope of exposures means that shocks in particular emerging markets will have differential impacts in different industrialised economies.
The extent to which Spanish banks are exposed to developments in Latin America is particularly striking, with outstanding claims equivalent to 30% of domestic GDP. Around Spain's largest bank, Santander Central Hispano, set aside €1.29bn, an amount equal to the total value of its investment in its Argentinean subsidiary Banco Rio de la Plata (Argentina's third largest bank), to cover potential losses. An additional €1.09bn was set aside to cover potential losses elsewhere in Latin America.
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BBVA, Spain's second largest bank, also set aside €1.35bn to cover potential losses from its Argentinean subsidiary Banco Frances, Argentina's second largest bank (Crawford, 2002a,b) . Taken together these three sets of provisions amounted to 0.6% of Spanish GDP in 2000. 
IV. The Determinants and Impact of Cross-Border Banking Mergers

IV.1 Determinants
In practice there are a wide range of factors that may determine the pattern of specialisation and location over time. Multinational enterprises arise through a combination of industrial organisation motives that result in a number of activities being placed under common ownership and control, and comparative advantage reasons that cause these activities to be placed in separate countries (Krugman, 1995) .
Empirical studies of profit maximising multinational firms point to factors such as market size in the host and home locations, the relative costs of production in different locations, the presence of external agglomeration economies from factors such as skilled labour and clusters of related firms, barriers to the entry of foreign product markets and fiscal instruments such as investment incentives and tax structures as important determinants of the scale, timing and location of investments (Barrell and Pain, 1999; Hubert and Pain, 2002) .
Most cross-border investments continue to take place between industrialised economies. This indicates that models of location choice must involve more than just considerations of relative costs. Theories of the multinational firm (Dunning, 1995; Markusen, 1995) and the econometric evidence on the determinants of FDI both highlight the extent to which the decision to establish foreign subsidiaries is influenced by the scope to appropriate the rents accruing from the development of firm-specific knowledge-based assets and practices.
All these factors can be expected to have some bearing on the decisions of profit-maximising financial companies to invest overseas. Such investments may help to diversify risk and also allow economies of scale and scope to be exploited, especially by financial institutions from countries with a relatively small domestic market. As in many other service sectors, foreign presence is often essential for successful market entry. Useful summaries of the extant literature are provided by Focarelli and Pozzolo (2001) , Moshirian (2001) and Molyneux (2002) . Deregulation and technological advances have raised the feasible span of the firm and reduced barriers to market entry, although prudential regulations continue to limit the foreign exposure of some financial institutions.
Two clear findings are that larger and more efficient banks are more likely to expand internationally (Focarelli and Pozzolo, 2001; Esperanca and Gulamhussen, 2001) , and that their targets are more likely to be small, but well-run and capitalised, banks. Some key characteristics of a sample of banks in the OECD economies are summarised in Table 5. 12 These confirm that large banks are much more likely to undertake acquisitions abroad than are small banks. Conversely, small banks are more likely to be the target for any acquisition, including minority shareholdings, than are large banks. There is also a clear positive correlation between overseas acquisitions and size, with the mean asset levels of banks with foreign shareholdings around 2½ times those without foreign shareholdings. This is true for both large and small banks. However foreign investment does not appear to affect the relative scale of different types of bank. The mean asset level of large banks is around 13 times that of small banks, irrespective of whether they have foreign shareholdings or not. 
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A distinctive feature of cross-border investment in financial services lies in the strong interlinkages with cross-border investments by non-financial firms, which in turn reflect the wider process of economic integration within and between supranational markets. Historically, many banks initially entered foreign markets in order to provide services to their home-country clients. Thus the international openness of home economies to trade is often correlated with the extent of international investment by their financial institutions. Moshirian (2001) finds that the location of banking FDI from the US, the UK and Germany is related both to the pattern of bilateral trade between them and host economies and to the level of FDI by non-financial firms from the home economies. Esperanca and Gulamhussen (2001) find that some foreign banks establish branches in the United States because of the presence of non-corporate customers, as measured by the number of immigrants from the home economy. Focarelli and Pozzolo (2001) also find that the ratio of exports to GDP helps to explain the cross-country variation in the degree of internationalisation of domestic banks, although this measures becomes insignificant when they consider only a sample of large banks. One explanation for this latter finding is that it is smaller banks who benefit from the activities undertaken by their domestic clients in foreign markets; all large banks already have international firms amongst their client base.
An under-researched area concerns the policies available to host countries to try and influence the location of international financial institutions within wider supra-national markets. This topic is particularly pertinent for the UK at the present time, faced with the decision over whether to enter the Euro Area. In 1997 the UK government proposed a series of economic 'tests' that would need to be satisfied before Britain could enter monetary union. One of these concerned the impact on the domestic financial services industry and the City of London. A key issue here, on which there is little empirical evidence at present, is the extent to which the agglomeration economies available in the City will continue to outweigh those available in other financial centres, such as Frankfurt and Paris, which are located in the Euro Area and are becoming more important bases for some institutions seeking to undertake panEuropean transactions.
IV.2 The Gains from Mergers
The large literature on the impact of within-border mergers and acquisitions by banks provides little evidence of significant subsequent cost savings, or efficiency improvements on the average transaction (Berger et al, 1999 and , although this does not mean that all mergers have been unsuccessful. Indeed the motivation for consolidation is likely to vary between financial institutions according to their primary business and size. Using a panel data set of banks and other financial institutions in France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, and the UK during 1992-1997, Cavallo and Rossi (2001) suggest that efficiency in smaller banks is improved by raising their scale of production. For larger institutions, efficiency gains are more likely to be achieved through diversification of their output mix. Altunbaş et al (2001) , using a sample of European banks for 1989-97, confirm that scale economies are widespread for the smallest banks, 14 but suggest that banks of all sizes have scope for cost savings through reducing managerial and other organisational inefficiencies.
There is only a small literature on the impact of cross-border mergers and acquisitions in banking. Although such transactions are predominantly undertaken by larger and more efficient banks, this does not appear to be automatically reflected in the performance of their foreign subsidiaries. Berger et al (2000) show that only US banks are more efficient than local competitors in the UK, France, Germany and Spain, although in a number of countries foreign banks can be as efficient as domestic banks. Buch and Golder (2001) suggest that foreign banks have a comparative cost disadvantage over domestic banks due to entry costs and asymmetric information about the operations and constraints of the regulatory structure in the host market.
There remains a possibility that the observed differences in the efficiency of domestic and foreign banks are artificially generated through one of two channels -transfer pricing within the firm so that profits are realised by parent companies not subsidiaries, or a failure to control adequately for differences in the types of activity undertaken. For example, domestic banks may have a different cost structure to foreign banks because they have a stronger presence in the retail banking market, allowing them freedom to spread costs over a larger customer base. Ideally, matched sampling or case studies of individual institutions before and after the injection of foreign equity are required to produce soundly based evidence. Case studies are certainly required if anything is to be learned from the wave of joint ventures and alliances recorded in Table 3 .
The extant literature on the impact of mergers contains relatively little research that permits an informed assessment of whether the potential benefits from universal banking, either within or across borders, are being realised. For European institutions product diversification is particularly attractive if they wish to concentrate business within the European market given that monetary union reduces the likely benefits of geographic diversification. Vander Vennet (2002), using a sample of 2,375 EU banks in 1995-6, finds that universal banks, particularly outside Germany, and financial conglomerates have greater operational efficiency than specialised banks. If so, then any further moves towards these forms of organisation within the EEA should improve the efficiency of the financial system. The findings on efficiency gains suggest that foreign banks may find it difficult to gain significant market share in many countries. Indeed it is usual to find that the share of foreign institutions in the total number of banks is much bigger than their share of the total assets of the domestic banking sector in most industrialised economies. Although the benefits of the wave of cross-border transactions and alliances in the 1990s may have been weaker than some participants expected, there are no reasons to believe that the impact of deregulation and the concomitant globalisation of financial markets have come to an end. The market for retail banking is inevitably going to retain a strong local bias, but the continued evolution of information technologies and electronic finance is likely to continue to create strong incentives and opportunities for cross-border expansion in wholesale and investment banking, insurance and other specialist financial services. The underlying rationale for cross-border investment -the need for a large distribution platform to cover the costs of developing and offering new products, has not changed. But as the costs of consolidation of large financial institutions rise, strategic alliances and joint ventures may become an increasingly attractive mode of international transactions (G10, 2001).
V. The Impact of Financial Market Integration
The increasing internationalisation and integration of financial markets has a number of important policy consequences. In this section we focus on two of the most important -the implications for the regulation of financial institutions and markets and the impact of financial development on the longer-term prospects for economic growth.
V1. Financial Risk and Regulation
If consolidation in financial markets within and across borders has changed the probability that some institutions might fail or become illiquid, then it may also have changed the possibility of systemic risk, given the increasing extent of interlinkages between institutions, either directly or indirectly via their common exposures to many different national markets. These issues are discussed in detail in Berger et al (1999 and and G10 (2001) . The economic effects of systemic crises can be large; there have, for instance, been several examples of major domestic banking crises in OECD economies since 1980 with the ultimate costs to governments being as high as 9-12% of GDP in the cases of Finland and Mexico, and 3½% of GDP in the United States (OECD Economic Outlook, June 1998, Box I.7).
Of course, one of the motives for institutions to expand either their geographic scope or their product range is to try and diversify risk. Identifying activities whose returns have low or negative correlation with those of their core business should improve risk diversification. But this need not necessarily be reflected in the risk of the individual institution. For instance, the gains from diversification may be utilised to make higher risk/return investments. In this case the principle benefits should be reflected in profitability rather than in an overall reduction of risk levels. Joint ventures may offer a better way of reducing some forms of risk than mergers and acquisitions, but they will not remove the costs of adverse selection if an inappropriate partner is chosen.
Equally, risks may rise as institutions become larger and more complex, especially if managers are having to expand the scope of their supervision to include markets or products with which they lack expertise, or attempting to integrate organisations that have very different corporate cultures.
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The collapse of the (then) British-owned Barings Bank in 1995 stemmed largely from defects in monitoring procedures that allowed an individual employee to conceal trading losses of £1.4 billion arising from complex financial operations in East Asia. The near failure of Long-Term Capital Management, a highly leveraged US controlled hedge fund, in 1998 further underlines the extent to which the increasing complexity of financial activities can complicate financial supervision.
Even if the risks faced by individual institutions have fallen, the possibility of systemic risk may have risen (G10, 2001; ECB, 2000) . Consolidation and the increasing complexity of institutions have raised the probability that liquidity problems in one institution could spread to others both within and across national borders, particularly if the same institution is subject to different regulatory regimes in different countries. Contagion might also increase the cost of rescue operations in countries which have publicly backed deposit guarantee schemes. Equally, some institutions might become so large they are considered too big to fail, creating potential moral hazard problems (Berger et al, 2000) . A related issue is the extent to which foreign-owned institutions have become an increasing source of potential instability for host countries, especially relatively small ones.
The existence and anticipated continued growth of financial conglomerates is likely to require continued changes in the structure of regulatory systems. National regulatory structures are likely to face greater pressures for convergence in every financial sector, since the health of national institutions will increasingly depend on the effectiveness of the prudential regulations limiting what they can undertake in other countries. Risk-based capital standards are likely to become an increasingly important tool for regulators, as well as for internal monitoring. Increased co-operation will also be required in those countries with separate regulators of banking, insurance and securities markets. Competition policies at a supranational level also have an important role to play, along with measures to force greater transparency and improved accounting practices. An example is the range of measures in the EU Financial Services Action Plan.
In the European Economic Area the development of cross-border activities and financial conglomerates creates a need for closer supervisory co-operation between member states (ECB, 2000) . Memoranda of understanding are already in place to facilitate such cooperation at the bilateral level, while work is under way in the EU and at the wider international level to develop further the prudential regulation of financial conglomerates.
Regulators in the industrialised economies also need to consider the particular problems that might emerge from the exposure of national institutions in emerging markets. The financial crises in South-East Asia, Latin America and Russia during 1997-98 underline the importance of well functioning financial markets and risk management systems for economic performance. One of the problems in each of these developing regions in the build up to the crises was a gradual accumulation of short-term financial commitments (FSF, 2000) . Although a high proportion of short-term commitments is common in most countries, it can cause particular difficulties to developing economies who are particularly reliant on trade revenues to generate the income required to pay back maturing debt. Short-term capital flows to these countries thus entail liquidity risk, and abrupt changes in sentiment, or sharp fluctuations in primary commodity prices, that lead to portfolio adjustments and debt repayment problems can have systemic consequences.
The proportion of short-term loans in total international bank lending to the developing regions is shown in Chart 4.
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Short-term bank loans are defined as those with a maturity of less than 1 year. In mid-2001, the proportion of outstanding loans that were short-term was smaller in most developing regions than in developed economies, with the notable exception of Africa and the Middle East. Total bank loans to the developing countries rose from $657 billion in mid-1996 to $828 billion in mid-2001. But it is notable that reporting banks have reduced their short-term exposure to several regions since the mid-1990s. This was particularly marked in Asia, where the proportion of short-term loans declined from around two-thirds in 1996 to under one half by 1999. A gradual reduction in the proportion of short-term loans in Latin America and the transition economies of Central and Eastern Europe is also apparent since 1997-98. 16 The figures in the chart and this paragraph exclude claims in local currencies by the foreign affiliates of the reporting banks. These are however included in Table 4 .
V.2 Financial Development and Economic Growth
The relationship between financial development and economic growth has been analysed extensively in recent years. Theoretical modelling and empirical evidence have both suggested that well developed capital markets, typically measured by indicators such as the scale of the banking industry and stock market capitalisation, can aid the prospects for sustainable long-run economic growth (Pagano, 1993; Levine, 1997; Levine and Zervos, 1998; Tsuru, 2000) .
In a neo-classical world the form of the financial system might be expected to have little effect on economic growth, with perfect information and few transactions costs obviating the need for financial institutions. Equally, if there were no capital market imperfections the Modigliani-Miller theorems would suggest that different types of corporate financing would not matter for the investment decisions of the firm. But in a world of incomplete information, with potential dead-weight costs associated with bankruptcy, the structure of capital markets may matter.
If savers and borrowers cannot be matched costlessly, financial systems can contribute to the growth process by providing services that help to mobilise and allocate savings, diversify risk and monitor the behaviour of borrowers. If potential borrowers and lenders have asymmetric information, individual investors face agency costs arising from adverse selection (the risk of financing an inherently uneconomic project) and moral hazard (an inability to monitor perfectly the allocation of the funds by the borrower). Securities markets and financial intermediaries such as banks can help to overcome some, although not all, of these costs by undertaking delegated monitoring and assessment (Diamond, 1984) . In turn this may help in the development of larger scale and higher-return investment projects.
An efficient financial system can simultaneously lower the cost of external borrowing, raise the returns to savers, and ensure that savings are allocated to projects that promise the highest returns, all of which have the potential to affect economic growth rates. However it may also reduce the level of household savings by easing liquidity constraints. This would moderate the effects of liberalisation on growth, although not necessarily on consumer welfare.
The ongoing liberalisation of the regulations governing institutional investors in the EEA and North America should raise the level of financial intermediation. This in turn should help to raise the level of investment, and hence the level of output in the world economy as a whole.
Greater financial intermediation allows risks to be shared and encourages the global allocation of capital towards projects with the highest marginal product. The expansion of new forms of financial activity, such as venture capital, may also encourage enterprise and innovation, with potential beneficial consequences for future productivity growth. However other developments, such as the consolidation of the banking sector through acquisitions of small, regionally based credit institutions, can at times adversely affect the flow of bank lending to small firms (Berger et al, 1999 and .
The evolving structure of national financial systems in Europe towards the US/UK marketbased model may be especially important in the light of the possibilities for new investment to utilise recent developments in information and communications technologies. Innovation and entrepreneurship are more likely to be enabled when risk-taking is equity based, through venture capital and other markets, rather than collateral based, as in a bank centred financial system. The latter are more likely to support long term investments for process improvements (where existing fixed capital provides collateral) than the establishment of new firms (who, by definition have little or no tangible collateral) to undertake product innovations.
Empirical Evidence
After controlling for conventional determinants of growth, such as fixed investment and human capital, Bassanini and Scarpetta (2001) find that GDP growth in the OECD economies is significantly related to two indicators of financial development, stock market capitalisation and, to a lesser extent, deposit bank claims on the domestic private sector, both expressed relative to GDP. Leahy et al (2001) find that both indicators also have a positive and generally significant effect on the level of investment. Taking the two sets of results together, Leahy et al (2001) estimate that a rise of 10 percentage points in the ratios of stock market capitalisation to GDP and private sector credit to GDP will ultimately raise GDP per capita by 3.3% and 1.1% respectively, other things remaining equal.
The plausibility of this finding is difficult to judge. It stems from estimation results which include the relatively smooth expansion in financial development during the 1970s and 1980s. At face value it implies that there should ultimately be a large rise in living standards associated with the recent changes in financial markets in the 1990s. For instance, stock market capitalisation in Switzerland rose from 64% of GDP in 1990 to over 300% by 2000.
The semi-elasticities cited in Leahy et al (2001) imply that this should eventually be associated with a rise of over 80% in GDP per capita. It is difficult to think of economic mechanisms by which this might come about given that Switzerland already has one of the highest per capita incomes of all the industrialised economies.
A further difficulty in interpreting the relationship between growth and financial development lies in the possibility of reverse causality. Financial development may well be led by economic growth, with banks and other financial institutions being attracted to countries in which future economic growth is expected to offer profitable opportunities. Some key financial indicators for twenty industrialised economies, including the thirteen considered in G10 (2001) , are summarised in Table 6 . There are clear differences across countries in the scale of different forms of financial activity although the rapid rate of growth of financial market transactions, especially in equity markets, is readily apparent in almost all of them. Cross-border mergers and acquisitions activity is included in the data for the combined total of inward and outward FDI stocks as a proportion of GDP.
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There was a marked rise in FDI linkages in all countries during the 1990s, with the notable exception of Japan.
Switzerland is clearly an outlier amongst these group of countries. By 2000 the ratio of stock market capitalisation to GDP was well above that seen in any other economy. The amount of private domestic credit advanced by deposit banks in 1997 was higher in relation to GDP than in any other country, and the combined stocks of inward and outward FDI were greater than in all countries apart from Belgium. A similar pattern existed in 1990. Despite the significant scale of financial development, GDP growth through the 1990s was poor, indicating that many other factors need to be included in any detailed empirical exercise to explain variations in cross-country economic performance.
Ireland is also a clear outlier, with an annual rate of GDP growth over twice that in any other country. If GNP were used instead as a metric the gap would narrow, but would still be apparent. None of the Irish financial development indicators in 1990 appear to be greatly different from those in other countries, although the FDI data are more difficult to measure accurately for Ireland than for some other countries. The scale of financial development in Ireland during the 1990s is also suggestive of the possible stimulus to financial markets that may be provided by strong economic performance.
The cross-sectional correlations between various forms of financial activity in 1990 and average annual GDP growth between 1990-2000 are shown in Charts 5-7 for all countries in Table 6 apart from Ireland. Regression coefficients are reported in Table 7 . There are 3 sets of results. Panel A includes all countries except Ireland, Panel B also excludes Switzerland and Panel C also excludes Japan. Whilst care should be taken in drawing conclusions from cross-sectional relationships of this type, particularly given the number of other possible determinants of growth that are excluded from the analysis, it is of interest that taken together the four indicators we consider can capture around one-half of the cross-sectional variation. In general the regression results suggest that countries with more open international capital markets and better developed equity markets in 1990 enjoyed higher growth rates in the subsequent decade than those countries in which bank and bond finance were relatively more important. However they also illustrate the difficulties in explaining the relationship between growth and financial development. For instance, stock market capitalisation is found to be significantly correlated with growth in many empirical studies. Yet two of the countries with the most highly valued stock markets in 1990, Japan and Switzerland, also had the weakest average annual GDP growth rates during the 1990s. These two observations are sufficient to induce the negative cross-sectional relationship shown in Chart 5 and column [1] of Panels A and B in Table 7 . Dropping them from the sample brings about the positive cross-sectional relationship between growth and stock market capitalisation in column [1] of Panel C of Table 7 , although the coefficient is not significant. This demonstrates how the results from any cross-country empirical exercise could easily be influenced by the range of countries included in the sample, as well as the difficulties of abstracting from cyclical developments.
Chart 6 shows that there is also a negative cross-sectional relationship between bond market capitalisation in 1990 and GDP growth in the 1990s. The regression results in column [2] of Table 7 suggest that this is not sensitive to whether Switzerland and Japan are included in the sample. Indeed in column [5] , when all the indicators are included jointly, the bond market capitalisation variable has a significant negative coefficient. The coefficients imply that each 10 percentage point rise in bond market capitalisation as a ratio of GDP is associated with a reduction of between 0.06-0.08 percentage points in average annual GDP growth.
A similar picture emerges from using the 1990 stock of private domestic credit advanced by deposit banks as a ratio of national GDP. Chart 7 shows that there is a negative crosssectional relationship between credit and growth in the 1990s, again contrary to the findings from many existing empirical studies. The negative coefficient on credit in the simple linear regression in column [3] of Table 7 is highly significant when Switzerland is included, but still remains significant if it is excluded. Credit has a significant negative coefficient in all three regressions reported in column [5] of Table 7 .
In contrast, a more striking finding apparent from Chart 8 and columns [4] and [5] of Table 7 is that there is a positive cross-sectional relationship between growth and the size of FDI stocks in 1990. Again, this becomes significant if Switzerland is excluded from the sample. In this latter case the results from a simple linear regression suggest that each 10 percentage point increase in FDI stocks as a ratio of GDP is associated with an increase of 0.17 percentage points in average annual GDP growth (standard error 0.072 percentage points).
The cross-sectional variation in FDI stocks in 1990 captures one-fifth of the cross-sectional variation in GDP growth rates during the 1990s. It is difficult to be confident about the scale and direction of any relationship between FDI and growth from a simple partial regression of this kind, although it is consistent with evidence that FDI has raised technical progress in many countries (Barrell and Pain, 1999; Pain, 2000) , and there is nothing to guarantee that it is stable over time. Nonetheless it does suggest that the growing level of cross-border activity during the 1990s might improve the prospects for economic growth in the years to come.
Other recent empirical work has sought to examine the specific mechanisms through which financial systems may affect growth, focussing in particular on the importance of financial framework conditions, such as the regulatory environment within which banks and capital markets operate, and on the differential impact across industries within countries according to their dependence on external finance following the approach pioneered by Rajan and Zingales (1998) .
A related issue is whether different forms of corporate governance, as proxied by the share of equity held by institutional investors, also matter. The studies cited above suggest that the size of the banking sector can matter for economic development. A related issue explored by Cetorelli and Gambera (2001) and Cetorelli (2001) is whether the structure of the banking sector also matters. The former consider growth over 1980-90 in a sample of 36 industries in 41 countries, which include some developing countries as well as the OECD economies. They find that higher concentration in the national banking sector has a significant negative relationship with growth. However this effect is much smaller, and in some cases even positive, in those industries which are heavily reliant on external finance. One explanation of this finding is that increased concentration is associated with some general inefficiencies and a reduction in credit availability in imperfectly competitive credit markets. But at the same time relationship banking may be more likely, with larger banks developing closer ties with their client firms.
In a related study Cetorelli (2001) explores the effects of banking structure on the structure of the industrial sector, using a sample of 35 manufacturing industries for 17 OECD economies.
Her results suggest that there is a significant positive relationship between average firm size and the concentration of the domestic banking sector.
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Again this is especially evident in industries which are relatively reliant upon external finance. However it is found to be weaker in countries with a higher overall level of financial development.
An implication of these results is that the increasing concentration seen within the US and European banking systems over the past 20 years may offset some of the wider benefits that have resulted from the overall expansion in the size and scale of the banking sector. At the same time, greater bank concentration may be helping to contribute to the formation, and subsequent conduct, of larger industrial companies in at least some industries and countries.
VI. Concluding Comments
Deregulation, technological change and the growing cross-border interdependencies of nonfinancial firms have all contributed to the rapid growth in the scale and scope of financial institutions over the past twenty years. National markets have become less segmented, and 18 Banking concentration in this paper and Cetorelli and Gambera (2001) is measured as the average between 1989 and 1995 of the sum of the market shares of the 3 largest banks in each national market.
significant consolidation has taken place both within and across national borders. One consequence of these changes is that distinctions between different types of financial systems are becoming weaker. In the United States, financial holding companies operating across a large number of product markets are beginning to emerge, whilst in many European countries equity and bond markets are gradually becoming a more important source of finance relative to the previously dominant banking sector. Continuing deregulation, especially in Europe, the impact of monetary union on portfolio allocations and location choice, and the ongoing integration of global markets for goods and services are all likely to provide incentives for further consolidation and growth in financial markets.
A smaller proportion of financial sector corporate deals take place across national borders than in the non-financial sector, despite the greater likelihood that a foreign presence may be required for market entry. This either points to the greater costs of establishing foreign facilities in the financial sector or it suggests that regulatory barriers to entry still remain in some markets (Davies, 2002) . Insurance and securities firms are much more likely to invest abroad than banking institutions, although the share of cross-border transactions in the total number of corporate deals undertaken by banks has risen in recent years.
Joint ventures and strategic alliances have become a more common form of cross-border consolidation than mergers and acquisitions, at least in numerical terms. Unfortunately, little information is available to quantify the value, the sector mix or the impact on operating conditions of such alliances. The evidence on the impact of mergers and acquisitions suggests that they are not always successful, at least not when judged in terms of the efficiency of the merged institutions. Larger and more efficient firms are more likely to expand overseas, and smaller companies are more likely to be purchased. Possibly for this reason, or other difficulties such as the work involved in integrating firms with differing corporate cultures that are operating under different regulatory structures, foreign subsidiaries tend to be smaller and less efficient than domestic firms in host markets. Joint ventures provide an alternative mode of market entry that may bypass some of these difficulties and reduce risks; indeed they appear to be more prevalent in those markets that have higher barriers to entry.
In an endogenous growth framework, financial development can promote economic growth via its positive impact on capital productivity or the efficiency with which financial systems convert savings into fixed investment. But the close statistical relationship between financial development and growth found in many studies may not necessarily imply causality from financial development to economic growth, nor that the relationship is constant over time.
Looking at the experience of the 1990s, it appears that cross-border transactions, as measured by FDI, may be more closely associated with the cross-country variation in growth rates in the OECD economies than either stock market capitalisation, bond market capitalisation or bank lending to the private sector.
The rapid growth in the size of some financial institutions may also have other consequences.
Increased concentration within the banking sector appears to be associated with increased concentration within non-financial sectors, which has implications for competition policies.
Regulators also have to remain vigilant against the increased possibilities of systemic risk and the possibility that some institutions become 'too big to fail'.
The scale of foreign activities undertaken by existing client firms from home markets continues to be one of the key determinants of the decision of banks to expand overseas, as do the external economies available from locating in international financial centres. But the interrelationships between banking and industrial concentration suggest that some industrial location decisions may now be influenced by the location of overseas subsidiaries of financial institutions with whom investing firms do business in their home market. The pattern of international trade in services may also be affected by the location of financial services companies. Further research is called for on these questions.
